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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the representation of women on the boards
(WOMBDs) and audit committees is associated with a reduction in the practice of earnings management
and whether women are associated with income reducing (conservative) rather than income-increasing
(aggressive) earnings management. The authors further argue that family ownership moderates the
relationship between the presence of WOMBDs and audit committees and earnings management.
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses non-finance firms listed on Bursa Malaysia over a
period of four years, i.e. from 2008 until 2011.
Findings – The evidence reveals that the presence of WOMBD or audit committee is not associated
with a propensity for earnings management. In addition, the evidence also reveals that family
ownership does not interact either with WOMBD or with women on the audit committee (WOMAC) to
influence the propensity for earnings management. Nevertheless, the additional analyses show that,
while women on boards are not associated with income-decreasing accruals, the presence of women on
audit committees leads to income-reducing earnings management. The evidence further reveals that
family ownership does not interact with either WOMBD or WOMAC to influence income-decreasing
earnings management.
Originality/value – This study extends prior research on the role of women directors and women
audit committee members on earnings management focussing on family ownership. Further, the study
also examines the direction of earnings management as opposed to the most prior studies, which
mainly focus on the propensity of earnings management.
Keywords Board of directors, Women directors, Family ownership, Earnings management,
Audit committee, Board diversity
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
The issue of earnings quality and earnings management has been the subject of intense
research following instances of corporate financial failure and fraud by large firms such
as Enron in 2001 and WorldCom in 2002 in the USA and Pharmalat in 2003 in Italy.
Malaysia is no exception as it also has had its own scandals involving listed companies
such as Transmile and Megan Media, whose accounting irregularities were discovered
in 2007. Earnings management, while it is legal, is considered unethical because it
affects the credibility of companies and the capital market. It is unethical because
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the management’s intention is to mislead some stakeholders or to influence contractual
outcomes by altering the firm’s accounts (Healy and Wahlen, 1999).
Of late, the issue of women on boards has received significant attention as it is argued
that women directors can potentially change boardroom behaviours. Women’s ethical
values, leadership styles, and higher level of risk aversion mitigate the practice of
earnings management in a firm (Daily and Dalton, 2003; Eckel and Grossman, 2008;
Fehr-Duda, 2006; Krishnan and Parsons, 2008; Stephenson, 2004; Watson and
McNaughton, 2007). To date, a number of studies have investigated whether women’s
participation in top management is able to mitigate earnings management. Generally, the
research findings indicate that the presence of women in top management is associated
with a reduction in the practice of earnings management (Krishnan and Parsons, 2008;
Srinidhi et al., 2011) and the adoption of earnings management strategies that are more
conservative (Peni and Vahamaa, 2010). However, Sun et al. (2011), on the other hand,
find no association between gender and earnings management. All of the above studies
employ US data. Hence, a study of this issue in the context of Malaysian companies is of
benefit not least because the cultural and business environment is different from that
of the US or the UK, where most of the studies on this topic have been based.
Even though Buniamin et al. (2012) find a positive association between women
directors and earnings management in Malaysia, there are several limitations in their
study, which the current research intends to address. First, their study employed only a
single period. Single-period data may not be able to capture the associations between
variables, especially about causalities and dynamic adjustments. Discretionary accruals
(DACC) are mean-reverting, i.e. upward accrual adjustment in the year is adjusted
downward in the subsequent year, or vice versa. Hence, looking only at a single period
might distort the representation of the actual situation. Second, their study used only one
definition of women directors on the board, i.e. the number of women directors on the
board. Relying on only one measure limits the robustness of the findings. Therefore, in
the present study, we use four measures for female representation on the board: the mere
presence of women, the number of women, the proportion of board size (BODSIZE), and
the presence of two or more women on the board (WOMBD). Third, their study on DACC
in the Malaysian context omitted some important control variables that are found to
affect DACC in prior studies, such as firm size, firm performance, ownership, industries,
and audit quality (Abdullah and Mohd Nasir, 2004; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali,
2006; Johl et al., 2007; Mohd Saleh et al., 2007). In addition, family ownership is associated
with women directors (Abdullah, 2014). Hence, in the current study, we included these
control variables to avoid bias in the results.
Additionally, although Islam, the dominant religion in Malaysia, does not encourage
women to take up leadership roles and women in Eastern culture do not usually
undertake such roles as is more commonly the case in Western culture, Malaysia has
introduced several measures for women’s advancement in this regard. One major
catalyst for this development was the establishment of a ministry in 2001 that specifically
promotes the interests of women in the country. In addition, in 2004, the Government
formed the Cabinet Committee on Gender Equality, chaired by the then Prime Minister of
Malaysia. Consequently, the Government adopted a policy to appoint at least 30 per cent
women to decision-making levels in the public sector. Subsequently, in July 2011, the
Government extended the policy to listed firms and set 2016 as the deadline for
compliance. Although the policy has no legal backing, it mirrors the approach taken by
the governments of Norway and other countries in Europe. While there is a policy on the








































women to the audit committee. Hence, the appointment of women to the audit committee
is at the discretion of the individual firm. This study therefore examines the influence of
women in both these corporate governance roles. Specifically, it is hoped that the findings
from this study will shed light on the contribution of WOMBD of directors and the audit
committee to constraining earnings management, especially in a country that is
predominantly Muslim but where, at the same time, the business practices are largely
shaped by the Malaysian Chinese community.
Another reason for looking at the Malaysian context is the unique ownership
structure of its listed firms. Unlike the US or the UK firms, Malaysian firms are closely
held (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). This pattern of ownership dictates the composition of
the board of directors and hence the audit committee; because the owners want to have
control over the firm, they appoint directors from among their family circle (Claessens
et al., 2000; Mok et al., 1992). Therefore, it is common for family-owned firms to have
women directors who are related to the controlling shareholders.
Generally, our results show that women on boards and audit committees are not able
to reduce the propensity for earnings management. There is also no evidence to suggest
that the interaction of WOMBD and on the audit committee has an influence earnings
management. In the additional analyses, audit committees with female representation are
more likely to be involved in income-decreasing earnings management, rather than
income-increasing earnings management. However, our evidence does not show that
family ownership interacts with women who sit either on the board or on the audit
committee to influence income-decreasing earnings management.
The structure of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we
discuss the issue of women at the decision-making level and family ownership. Next,
we present the theoretical background that informed the development of our
hypotheses and models to test the involvement and influence of women in top
management on earnings management and the moderating effect of family ownership.
Then, we describe the research design, which is followed by a presentation of the
results and their discussion. Next, we present the results of our additional analyses.
Finally, we make some concluding remarks on our findings and their implications.
2. Women at the decision-making level
Women can see where they want to go in their careers. However, in reality, they might
not be able to get there, i.e. they “hit the glass ceiling”. This phenomenon is not only
prevalent in Asian culture, but also in Western culture, and it is a widely accepted
perception that: “In any given occupation, and in any given public office, the higher the
rank, prestige or influence, the smaller the proportion of women” (Hansard Society,
1990, p. 2). In Asia, empirical evidence on women directors is very limited. In fact,
gender equality has only recently become a topical issue in Asian countries compared
to their Western counterparts. Traditionally, Asian families would expect men to be the
breadwinners while the women would be responsible for running the household. Even
Japan, a developed nation, still lags far behind other developed nations with respect to
the appointment of women to boards; in 1998, women only occupied 0.2 per cent of the
board seats in Japan (Corporate Women Directors International, 2009).
Elsewhere, research evidence indicates that there has been a significant
improvement in the proportion of female directors over the last two decades or so.
In the USA, for example, the proportion of female directors in the USA was only
4.7 per cent in 1987, but it rose to 13.6 per cent in 2003 (Catalyst, 2003), and by 2011










































also been observed in the UK where the proportion of female directors in UK FTSE 100
companies increased from a mere 3.7 per cent in 1995 to 8.6 per cent in 2003 (Conyon
and Mallin, 1997; Vinnicombe and Singh, 2003), and to 15 per cent in 2011 (Catalyst,
2012). The scenario in Norway is considerably different. Since 2003, listed companies in
Norway have been required by law to have at least 40 per cent of their board seats
occupied by women directors. Smith et al. (2006) report that the proportion of women
directors in the country increased from 6 per cent in 2000 to 22 per cent in 2003. By the
end of 2007, the proportion of women directors had increased to 37 per cent (Fouché,
2007), and in 2011 it stood at 40.1 per cent (Catalyst, 2012). In 2007, Spain took the same
approach as Norway, i.e. that 40 per cent of the board seats in listed firms with 250 or
more employees should be allocated to women and the deadline for compliance was
2015. Similarly, in 2010, the lower house of France’s parliament passed a new law that
compels companies to increase the proportion of women on their boards to 40 per cent
by 2016 (Deloitte, 2011). Prior to the passing of these enactments, the representation of
WOMBDs of Spain and French firms was 3.1 and 7.5 per cent, respectively (Heidrick
and Struggles, 2007).
In its 2004-2007 Achievement Report, the Malaysian Ministry of Women, Family
and Community Development reported that the percentage of women appointed to
senior position levels in the public sector increased to 18 per cent in 2004 and to 25 per cent
in 2007. However, in the corporate sector, a survey of the 2007 annual reports of
Malaysian listed firms shows that women held only 7.7 per cent of board seats
(Abdullah and Ku Ismail, 2013). In 2011, Prime Minister Najib announced that listed
firms must allocate at least 30 per cent of board seats to women by 2016. To ensure
compliance, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 (Securities
Commission, 2012) requires firms to disclose their policies on boardroom diversity in
their annual reports, including targets and measures taken to promote the presence of
women directors. Bridget Lai, the Group Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Alliance
Bank Malaysia, is confident that the situation will improve because the proportion of
women in universities outweighs that of men and thus companies will have to accept
that women will become an equally important source of human capital (Ang, 2008).
For instance, for the 2012 academic session, the intake of female students far
outnumbered the intake of male students in Malaysian Government funded
universities; out of a total of 38,549 new students, 25,372 (66 per cent) were female
students (IPT disaran tubuh tabung endowmen, 2012); this is in marked contrast to the
percentage of female enrolments in 1980 of 35 per cent (Merican, 2012).
In 2011, women represented 36.4 per cent of the total workforce in Malaysia and
27.6 per cent of working women held senior-level positions (Tuminez, 2012). In their
study on the main features of women directors in Malaysian listed firms, Ku Ismail and
Abdullah (2011) find that the majority the women directors belong to the Chinese ethnic
group (63 per cent), while 30 per cent belong to the Malay ethnic group. They also
reveal that 44 per cent of the female directors have a family relationship with the male
directors (Ku Ismail and Abdullah, 2011).
Stephenson (2004) suggests two primary hindrances are responsible for the lack of
female appointments to the board. First, women do not have the required operational
experience. Second, in general, women are not as ambitious, and they do not have the
drive to advance to the top. Thus, they are often invisible to male CEOs who are usually
responsible for recommending the appointment of board members. An earlier survey
by Burke (1997) on Canadian women directors reveals that the main reason that there








































women directors. Other reasons Burke identified (in descending order) are that
companies are not looking for women directors; companies perceive that women are not
qualified; and companies are reluctant to appoint women who have not served on other
boards. Thus, in order to be appointed to the board of a listed firm, aspiring women
need to be noticed by the CEO and the Nomination Committee Chairman.
3. Theoretical background and development of hypotheses
The successful generation of women leaders show that they succeed by “drawing on
the skills and attitudes they developed from their shared experience as women”
(Rosener, 1990, p. 119). Whereas men adopt a “transactional” or command-and-control
approach to leadership, women tend to adopt a “transformational”, interactive or the
participative approach to leadership. In the transactional approach, leaders regard job
performance as a series of transactions with subordinates in which the latter are
rewarded for services rendered and penalized for unacceptable performance. On the
other hand, transformational leaders transform the self-interest of their subordinates
into the interest of the group. This leadership style promotes involvement, the sharing
of power and information, enhancement of the self-worth of others and energizes
subordinates (Rosener, 1990). Unlike men, women leaders are more interested in
building relationships with their subordinates and they would rather be evaluated
based on employee satisfaction than on financial performance (Appelbaum and
Shapiro, 1993). A survey of fund managers in the USA, Germany, Italy, and Thailand
reveal that women are more risk averse, less overconfident and are more likely to shy
away from competition (Beckmann and Menkhoff, 2008). Using a laboratory
experiment with monetary incentives, Fehr-Duda (2006) also finds that women are
more risk averse than men. These findings have subsequently been supported by
Watson and McNaughton (2007) and Eckel and Grossman (2008).
Additionally, the gender socialization approach argues that men and women bring
different values into the workplace that shape their decisions and practices (Betz et al.,
1989). It is argued that men are more likely than women to break rules or to be less
ethical. For instance, empirical evidence indicates that men are more likely to engage in
unethical behaviour (i.e. Albaum and Peterson, 2006; Betz et al., 1989). However, it is
also anticipated that gender similarity would be observed due to occupational
socialization in the workplace (Mason and Mudrack, 1996).
Even though the arguments in favour of female appointments to the board are
overwhelming, empirical evidence from studies in various countries on the effects of
female appointments on a firm’s financial performance (often referred to as the
“business case”) is mixed (e.g. Erhardt et al., 2003 in the USA; Nguyen and Faff, 2007 in
Australia; Smith et al., 2006 in Denmark). Ku Ismail and Abdullah (2011) also find
mixed evidence in the Malaysian context. While they document a positive association
between WOMBD and return on assets (ROA), nevertheless, they also reveal a negative
association between Tobin’s Q and women’s representation on the board. Hence, in the
Malaysian context, the market appears not to be in favour of female appointments to
the board even though their presence is associated with higher performance in terms of
firms’ accounting profits.
3.1 Gender and earnings management
Earnings management refers to the situation in which managers use their discretion in










































the firm (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). The underlying motive of earnings management is
to move the reported earnings towards a desired goal (Merchant and Rockness, 1994).
One of the incentives for managers to manage earnings could be job security
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995). Earnings are also managed to influence contractual
outcomes (Healy and Wahlen, 1999), for instance to satisfy debt covenants and to meet
analysts’ forecasts. Following the 1997/1998 Southeast Asian financial crisis and the
subsequent financial collapse of several large firms such as Enron in 2001 and
WorldCom in 2002, earnings management became an ethical issue warranting serious
attention because the intention is essentially to mislead some stakeholders whose
decisions are based on the reported earnings. Corporate governance mechanisms,
including the board, which is regarded as the peak of the corporate governance, are
believed to be able to mitigate the practice of earnings management. Hence, there has
been a growing body of research examining the association between corporate
governance characteristics and earnings management (see e.g. Abdullah and Mohd
Nasir, 2004; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Bradbury et al., 2006; Hashim and
Devi, 2008a, b; Mohd Saleh et al., 2005, 2007 for studies on Malaysia and Shen and Chih,
2007; Van Der Zahn and Tower, 2004; Xie et al., 2003 for other jurisdictions). The
findings, although mixed, provide evidence that boards and audit committees that are
independent, knowledgeable, and active are less likely to manage earnings.
As the risk preference and leadership styles of men and women are different, their
attitudes towards earnings management are likely to be different. Therefore, the
presence of female directors changes the board’s behaviours and their ability to detect
earnings management because of women’s leadership style, which requires more
informed and extensive discussion of issues (Gul et al., 2011; Srinidhi et al., 2011).
However, Clikeman et al. (2001) observe no significant differences in the perception of
male and female accounting students in the USA and five Asian countries on earnings
management. The results remain similar even after controlling for the effect of
nationality. Similarly, Al-Hayale and Lan (2005) also find that gender and earnings
management are not related in the case of managers and external auditors in Jordan.
Nevertheless, in a study of students and business managers in the USA, Giocomino
et al. (2006) find that women tend to have a stricter view than men on earnings
management. Thus, based on a limited number of studies on perception, the attitudes of
men and women towards earnings management are mixed. However, these findings are
obtained from attitudinal-based studies and therefore may not be indicative of the
actual behaviour of managers when they face an actual business situation. Further, the
methods employed have limitations as far as reliability is concerned (Krishnan and
Parsons, 2008).
Based on an empirical study of the impact of women directors on earnings
management (Krishnan and Parsons, 2008), find that the participation of women in
senior management improves earnings quality, which supports the contention that
women are more ethical than men. Srinidhi et al. (2011) examined the association
between female board membership and earnings management by using three
measures: presence of women on boards, presence of women on audit committees, and
existence of women non-executive directors. They argue that women are different from
men in their attitudes towards ethics, risks, and leadership styles. Where leadership is
concerned, Srinidhi et al. (2011) describe women in top management as having “trust
building roles”. Hence, unlike men, the authors argue that women show greater concern
for interpersonal relationships and rely on rules of fairness. Their evidence supports








































there is a lower incidence of the practice of earnings management. Likewise, Gul et al.
(2011) also argue that female leadership style is based on trust and cooperation.
Consistent with their contention, they document a positive association between gender
diversity and stock price informativeness, which therefore suggests higher earnings
quality for firms that have WOMBD.
In contrast, Buniamin et al. (2012) reveal that the number of women directors on the
board of the top 100 Malaysian Corporate Governance indexed firms is associated
positively with DACC. Therefore, based on their evidence, the number of WOMBD
leads to higher earnings management activities. Sun et al. (2011), on the other hand, do
not find any association between the proportions of women directors on the audit
committee and earnings management in S&P 500 firms. They argue that even though
female directors may be more ethical than male directors, the former could not influence
the rest of the committee members, which is consistent with the minimum critical mass
argument proposed by Konrad et al. (2008). Therefore, studies examining the link
between gender diversity and earnings management provide mixed findings. However,
drawing on the perspectives of women’s leadership styles, their ethical values and their
attitudes towards risks, we believe that the presence of WOMBD and audit committee
is associated with lower earnings management. In addition, resource-based theory also
predicts that the presence of WOMBD and audit committee should be beneficial (Daily
and Dalton, 2003). Hence, we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1. Firms with female representation on the board are less likely to engage in
earnings management.
H2. Firms with female representation on the audit committee are less likely to
engage in earnings management.
3.2 Family ownership
As is typical of Asian firms, many Malaysian firms are closely held, with the
majority of them being controlled by families. In fact, Malaysia is ranked second, just
behind Indonesia, in terms of the percentage of family-owned listed companies in the
Asian region (Yueng, 2002). In Malaysia, many companies tend to experience the
Type II agency problem where conflict can occur between the controlling
shareholder and the minority shareholders, as opposed to the Type I agency
problem, where the conflict is between professional managers and shareholders,
which is typical in Western countries. The Type II agency problem is associated
with the expropriation of wealth by the controlling shareholder at the expense of the
minority shareholders due to weak investor protection (Fan and Wong, 2002; Leuz
et al., 2003) and the entrenchment effect of family ownership on earnings
management (Wang, 2006). In addition, since the controlling shareholder is often the
Chinese family, business practices are based the personal networking system
(guanxi) and the appointment of family members to top management is common
(Claessens et al., 2000; Mok et al., 1992).
There appears to be a link between family ownership and earnings management,
which can be explained in terms of the type of agency problem present. First, where
there is Type I agency, there is an alignment of interest between owners and managers.
Thus, consistent with the controlling shareholders holding a long-term view, the
alignment effect would reduce earnings management as there is less pressure on










































where there is a Type II agency problem and the entrenchment effect, conflict can occur
between the firm’s controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. With the voting
rights in their hands, the appointment of directors to the board is dominated by the
family shareholders. Due to a risk-averse inclination, family-owned firms have a higher
tendency to nominate board members (including women) from among family members
(Abdullah et al., 2016; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This practice potentially weakens
earnings quality because the family-member directors are beholden to the top
management of the firms and thus are less effective in discharging their monitoring
roles ( Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The nomination exercise also restricts the pool of
potential candidates, which in the case of women is already typically small. With a
smaller pool of candidates to select from, there is greater likelihood of nominating
lesser-qualified women (Abdullah, 2014; Siegel et al., 2011).
In family-owned firms, the main purpose of appointing independent directors is not
to monitor and control managers, but rather to seek their expertise and advice on
strategic directions (Anderson and Reeb, 2004; Johnson et al., 1996). Further, since the
board of directors is dominated by family members, the directors whom the family
appoints are less likely to go against the wishes of the controlling family members
( Jaggi et al., 2009). Evidence gathered by Jaggi et al. (2009) for their study on Hong
Kong firms reveals that while board independence (BODIND) reduces earnings
management, the negative association is weaker for family-controlled firms than for
non-family firms. Therefore, the link between BODIND and earnings management is
moderated by family ownership. The view that the value that gender diversity brings
to the board and audit committee is low in family-owned firms is based on the premise
that it is more critical to maintain family relationships and unity in order to secure the
family’s survival (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006) than to control the firm’s management,
who might also be family members. Hence, in family-owned firms, gender diversity
dampens initiatives to improve earnings quality as the environment limits their ability
to influence the decisions of the board and audit committee, and consequently their
effectiveness (Carter et al., 2010; Phillips et al., 2009). Thus, we hypothesize that:
H3. Family ownership weakens the relationship between female representation on
the board and earnings management.
H4. Family ownership weakens the relationship between female representation on
the audit committee and earnings management.
4. Empirical data
The sampling frame of this study are all companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa
Malaysia during the years 2008-2011, except for those in the finance, close-end funds, and
real estate investment trust (REIT) sectors. They were not included in the sample because
of their unique characteristics and the specific rules and regulations imposed on them by
the Central Bank of Malaysia. A company must have data for all four years in order to be
included in the sample; this is to ensure a balanced panel data set. The reason for
choosing the 2008 financial year as the beginning period is that this was the fourth year
of the implementation of the Government’s affirmative action on the appointment of at
least 30 per cent women to the decision-making level in the Government sector. Hence, it
is reasonable to assume that the spirit of the policy might have had a spill-over effect on
the corporate sector, and thus it would have been embraced by a number of companies as








































up to the 2011 financial year to avoid the confounding effects of the latest version of the
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance which was issued in 2012. In addition,
the Prime Minister of Malaysia in July 2011 announced a policy aim of achieving at least
30 per cent female representation on the boards of listed firms. Data on the boards of
directors and other non-financial information is available in the annual reports of the
sample firms, while financial data are available in Datastream.
This study uses DACC to measure the extent of earnings management. The DACC
were measured using the modified Jones model developed by Kothari et al. (2005). The
model incorporates the firm’s performance, i.e. the ROA which enhances the reliability
as earnings management varies with performance (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005).
In addition, the model is able to mitigate the problem of heteroscedasticity and mis-
specified issues that exist in other aggregate accruals models (Sun et al., 2011).
Initially, total accruals, being the difference between net income (before taxes,
extraordinary income and discontinued operations plus depreciation and amortization)
and cash flow from operations, deflated by lagged total assets, and are measured as
follows:
TACCi;t ¼ NI i;tCFOi;t





where TACC is total accruals for company i at time t; NIi,t is net income (before taxes,
extraordinary income and discontinued operations plus depreciation and amortization);
CFOi,t is cash flow from operations. The change in sales,ΔREVi,t−ΔRECi,t, adjusted by
the change in accounts receivables is to avoid endogenous bias ( Jeter and Shivakumar,
1999). The coefficients, i.e. α1, α2, α3, and α4, are computed for each Bursa Malaysia
sectorial classification for four years separately. NDACC for each firm for each year are
computed by fitting the values found in in the above equation into the following equation:





Finally, DACC are computed as follows:
DACCi;t ¼ TACCi;t=TAi;t1NDACCi;t=TAi;t1
We used the absolute value of DACC to measure the propensity for earnings
management, regardless of its direction. To this end, a panel data regression analysis is





where ACCRUAL, absolute value of DACC (ABSDACC) or signed DACC; WOMBD,
women’s participation in boards, 1 if a board has at least one female director,
0 otherwise, WOMAC, women’s participation in audit committees, 1 if an audit
committee has at least one female director, 0 otherwise; FAMOWN, family ownership in










































a vector of control variables, which includes BODIND, BODSIZE, company size
(COSIZE), audit committee size (ACSIZE), audit committee accounting expertise
(ACEXPRT), profitability (ROA), gearing (GRG), and auditor size (BIG4).
Consistent with previous studies on earnings management, relevant control
variables are included in our analysis. First, we posit that BODIND mitigates earnings
management. This is because the effectiveness of a board would depend on its
independence. Independent boards are more likely to enhance its oversight intensity,
leading to greater monitoring of managerial opportunism and lower earnings
management (Abdullah and Mohd Nasir, 2004; Brickley et al., 1994). Second, based on
previous findings in Malaysia, we predict that BODSIZE will be associated with greater
earnings management. Although resource dependency and agency theories predict that
large boards may lead to quality reporting, the problem of coordination among board
members may lead to poor monitoring functions. This is turn would lead to greater
earnings management (Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006).
Third, based on the political costs argument (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990), we
predict that COSIZE will be associated with earnings management. Having a high
political cost, large companies are more likely to be scrutinized closely by the
government, and any identified wrongdoing may result in the withdrawal of subsidies
or wealth transfers. Thus, large firms may manipulate accruals by lowering their
income. On the other hand, it could also be argued that, by virtue of its size, a large
company would be more likely to have more accruals. Fourth, we believe that audit
committee characteristics (ACSIZE and ACEXPRT) would reduce the management’s
incentive to manage earnings. This is because it is the role of audit committees to
monitor and detect irregularities in the financial reports, i.e. evidence of earnings
management. We posit that a larger audit committee size would enhance its monitoring
role. Furthermore, financially expert audit committees are more effective in mitigating
earnings management. This is because they understand issues related to accounting
and finance better, and thus make better judgements with respect to internal controls
and oversight (Bedard et al., 2004; Ku Ismail and Syed Abd Rahman, 2011).
Fifth, the impact of firm performance is controlled by including in the analyses the
ROA, i.e. the ratio of net income to total assets (e.g. Abdullah and Mohd Nasir, 2004;
Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Jaggi et al., 2009; Kothari et al., 2005;
Mohd Saleh et al., 2005, 2007). Firms experiencing financial difficulties and poor
performance have a higher tendency to manage earnings (Bartov et al., 2000).
Therefore, leverage (LEV) is included as another control variable, which is the ratio of
total debts to total assets and it is a measure of the risk of breaching debt covenants
(e.g. Abdullah and Mohd Nasir, 2004; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Mohd
Saleh et al., 2005, 2007; Sun et al., 2011; Young, 1998). Finally, we predict that auditor
quality (BIG4) will be able to mitigate earning management, as quality auditors are able
to detect irregularities as well as earnings management (e.g. Becker et al., 1998).
We measure BODIND by the proportion of independent directors on the board
(e.g. Abdullah and Mohd Nasir, 2004; Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Klein,
2002; Peasnell et al., 2005; Xie et al., 2003), BODSIZE by the total number of board
members (e.g. Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2005;
Xie et al., 2003) and COSIZE by the natural log of total assets (e.g. Abdul Rahman and
Mohamed Ali, 2006; Cahan, 2002; Xie et al., 2003). As for auditor size, a score of
1 is given if a company is audited by a BIG4 auditor, and 0 otherwise (e.g. Abdullah and
Mohd Nasir, 2004; Bedard et al., 2004; Chia et al., 2007; Johl et al., 2007; Jaggi et al., 2009;








































the number of committee members and the number of accounting experts in the
committee, respectively (e.g. Ku Ismail and Syed Abd Rahman, 2011; Mohd Saleh et al.,
2007; Sun et al., 2011).
5. Results and discussion
The population of companies listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia was 855 in
2008, 844 in 2009, 844 in 2010 and 822 in 2011, resulting in 2,758 firm-years. After
excluding companies with insufficient data, those designated under PN17 (i.e. the
classification for financially distressed firms), those in the finance, REIT and closed-
fund categories and those belonging to sectors that consist of less than six companies, a
total of 2,412 firm-years (603 companies) were included in the final sample. Table I
shows the distribution of female representation on boards.
Results in Table I indicate that 1,037 firm-years or 43 per cent of the sample have
women on their boards. A majority of the boards (714) have only one female director,
representing 29.6 per cent of the total board seats, and about two-thirds of the
firm-years that have women on boards. For these three years, 17,887 board seats were
available, out of which 1,442 (8.06 per cent) were held by women. There is a slight
increase of about 0.5 per cent compared to female representation on boards in 2007
(i.e. 7.7 per cent) (Abdullah and Ku Ismail, 2013). Table II presents the descriptive
statistics of all the variables included in the study.
The mean value of absolute DACC in our study is 0.0649, which is lower than that in
Buniamin et al. (2012), which was 0.0991. The mean value of absolute DACC found in
our study is slightly lower than the mean value of absolute DACC found in other
studies in Malaysia (e.g. Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali, 2006; Abdul Jalil and Abdul
Rahman, 2010). As for signed DACC, the mean value found in our sample is 0.0014.
This value is about the same as that in Abdul Rahman and Mohamed Ali (2006); lower
than that in other studies in Malaysia (e.g. Abdul Jalil and Abdul Rahman, 2010; Mohd
Saleh et al., 2005); and slightly higher than that in Buniamin et al. (2012). Thus, the
mean values of both absolute DACC and signed DACC are generally lower than the
mean values found in other studies in Malaysia. One explanation for these findings is
that, over time, earnings management is mean-reverting. As for female representation
on audit committees, the number of firm-years that have women on their audit
committees is 856 (35.5 per cent), or 82.5 per cent of firms that have women on their
boards. This evidence therefore suggests that when women are appointed to boards,
the majority of them are also appointed to audit committees. Thus, this indicates that
firms do recognize the importance of women’s monitoring role by appointing them to
their audit committees. Table III shows the univariate analysis results of the Pearson
correlation analysis.



















































The correlation results show that the presence of WOMBD is not associated with a
propensity for earnings management (ABSDACC). There is also a higher tendency for
female appointments on the board in family-owned firms, suggesting that these firms
appoint women directors from among their family members. However, the correlation
coefficient is below 0.8, indicating that multicollinearity between these two variables is
not serious (Field, 2007). However, the evidence further suggests that these women
directors are not likely to be appointed to the firms’ audit committees. Table IV
presents the results from the regression analysis with WOMBD, WOMAC and their
interactions with family ownership as the main independent variables with absolute
DACC as the dependent variable.
Our results indicate that the presence of women on boards and audit committees does
not appear to be important in curbing the practice of earnings management. Hence, our
evidence does not support H1 and H2. While our evidence is consistent with Sun et al.
(2011), it is inconsistent with other studies, such as Srinidhi et al. (2011) and Gul et al.
(2011). Sun et al. (2011) reveal that gender diversity on audit committee is not associated
with earnings management. On the other hand, Srinidhi et al. (2011) and Gul et al. (2011)
show that board gender diversity improves earnings quality. As suggested by Sun et al.
(2011), even though women are more ethical than men are, they might not be able to
influence the male counterparts on the issue of earnings management. Further, the lack of
critical mass of women, as argued by Konrad et al. (2008) might also explain the
insignificant influence of women on boards and audit committee on earnings
management. Our findings are also not consistent with Buniamin et al. (2012) who find
that WOMBD leads to a higher propensity for earnings management in Malaysia.
Perhaps, our larger sample size, use of panel data and inclusion of more control variables
in our analyses makes our findings more robust than those of Buniamin et al. (2012).
In fact, their mean value of absolute DACCwas higher than ours (0.0991 vs 0.0649). In the
Malaysian context, our evidence, to a certain degree, supports the earlier research
Panel A: continuous variables
Variables Min. Max. Mean SD
DACC −0.8488 0.7103 0.0014 0.0956
ABSDACC 0.0000 0.8489 0.0649 0.0703
BODIND 0.1429 1 0.4516 1.266
WOMBD 0 4 0.600 0.809
WOMBDPCTG 0 0.500 0.080 0.108
BODSIZE 3 17 7.416 0.1266
COSIZE 16.807 25.035 19.848 1.394
ACSIZE 2 6 3.24 0.509
ACEXPT 0 4 1.554 0.7861
ROA −1.1352 1.3871 0.0524 0.1088
LEV 0 2.0833 0.2602 0.2204
Panel B: dummy variables
Variables Yes (%) No (%)
WOMBD 1,037 (43.0) 1,375 (57.0)
WOMAC 1,556 (64.5) 856 (35.5)
WMN2 2,089 (86.6) 323 (13.4)
FAMOWN 1,516 (62.9) 897 (37.1)




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































findings documented by Abdullah et al. (2016) which show that the presence of WOMBD
is negatively perceived by the market. Their evidence could be interpreted that women’s
appointment to the board is seen as tokenism by the market. One explanation for the
contradiction between our findings and those of Buniamin et al. (2012) could be that the
period that they examined, i.e. 2008, was the year in which the global financial crisis
began because of the subprime mortgage fiasco in the USA. Although Malaysia was not
affected directly by the crisis, the Malaysian firms in their sample might have used
accruals to manage reported earnings, as evidenced by the higher mean value of absolute
DACC and lower mean value of signed DACC than found in our study. Hence, the
influence of women directors on the propensity for earnings management is contextual
rather than general (e.g. Williams and O’Reilly, 1998).
The association between family ownership and absolute DACC is not statistically
significant. Thus, as far as our evidence is concerned, the contentions that the Type II
agency problem and the entrenchment view that controlling shareholders would pursue
their own interests at the expense of other shareholders do not hold. It is possible that the
result could be explained by conflicts between the entrenchment effect and the alignment
effect of family-ownership earnings management (Wang, 2006). Another possible reason
is perhaps due to the similarity between family-owned and widely-held non-government
firms; both types of firms are mainly managed by the Chinese ethnic group and share the
same culture and characteristics (Abdullah et al., 2016).
ABSDACC ¼ a0þb1WOMBDþb2WOMACþb3FAMOWNþb4WOMBD
FAMOWN b5WOMAC  FAMOWNþ
P
biXþe
Without family interaction With family interaction
Independent variables Coefficients t-values Coefficients t-values
Constant −0.122 −0.79 −0.121 −0.78
WOMBD −0.007 −0.92 −0.004 −0.54
WOMAC −0.005 −1.17 −0.003 −0.63
FAMOWN 0.003 0.84 0.009 1.68
WOM×FAMOWN −0.008 −1.04
WOMAC×FAMOWN −0.007 −0.79
BODIND 0.047 1.90 0.047 −0.79
BODSIZE 0.002 0.87 0.002 0.81
ACSIZE 0.003 0.57 0.003 0.53
ACEXPRT 0.000 0.02 0.000 0.05
COSIZE 0.008 1.00 0.008 0.98
ROA −0.158 −8.62** −0.157 −8.59**
LEV 0.036 2.90** 0.034 2.81**
BIG4 −0.012 −1.53 −0.012 −1.55
Overall R2 0.011 0.012
F-statistics 8.90** 7.72**
Notes: n¼ 2,412. ABSDACC, absolute discretionary accruals; DACC, signed discretionary
accruals; WOMBD, the presence of women on the board (1: yes; 0: otherwise); WOMAC, the presence
of women on audit committee (1: yes; 0: otherwise); BODIND, the proportion of independent
directors on the board; BODSIZE, the number of directors on the board; ACSIZE, the number of
directors on audit committee; ACEXPERT, number of accounting experts on audit committee; COSIZE,
natural log of firm’s total assets; ROA, ratio of net income to total assets; LEV, ratio of total debts
to total assets; AUDTQLTY, audit quality (1: BIG4 auditors; 0: otherwise); FAMOWN, family own-











































Given that the influence of WOMBD and audit committee on earnings management is
not significant, and that the influence of family ownership on earnings management
is also not significant, the interactive effects of the presence of WOMBD and audit
committee and family ownership are also found to be not significant (the results are
shown in the third column in Table IV). Hence, both H3 and H4 are not supported. This
shows that family ownership does not weaken the relationship between women on
boards and audit committees and earnings management. It does not seem to matter
whether women sit on the board/audit committee of family- or non-family-owned firms;
they are not able to influence the practice of earnings management in either context.
Furthermore, women are not influenced by the controlling shareholders of family firms to
reduce earnings management. Therefore, our evidence does not support the view that
women are less effective in family-owned firms than women in non-family-owned firms,
which is not consistent with the findings of Jaggi et al. (2009). Rather, our evidence reveals
that, in all cases, women directors do not play a significant role in either curbing or
increasing the propensity for earnings management.
As for the control variables, the ROA is negatively associated with absolute DACC,
supporting our argument that poor-performing firms are more likely to manage
earnings compared to companies with strong financial performance. Our findings in
this regard support the argument by Bartov et al. (2000). In addition, LEV is found to
increase the propensity for earnings management, which is consistent with the findings
revealed by Buniamin et al. (2012) and Mohd Saleh et al. (2007). Hence, because of a
higher risk of breaching debt covenants, highly levered firms tend to manage earnings
(e.g. Koh, 2003). Other control variables (i.e. BODIND, BODSIZE, ACSIZE, ACEXPRT,
COSIZE, and BIG4) do not appear to influence the practice of earnings management.
The insignificant effect of BODIND may be because that although the directors are
independent by definition, they may not be independent in substance due to their close
relationship with management and controlling shareholders (Abdullah et al., 2016).
The findings also do not support the contention that effective audit committee
mechanisms and quality external auditor quality would enhance the quality of
financial reporting, including the detection the detection of the practice of earnings
management. Although larger audit committees could result in a better monitoring,
poor coordination among members of the audit committee may not result in reducing
earnings management. The greater financial expertise of an audit committee also does
not help in mitigating earnings management. Our study shows that higher financial
expertise is associated with larger audit committees. It may also be the case that
financial experts serving large audit committees would not be able to exercise their role
effectively because of coordination and communication problems among members.
Firm size is also not associated with earnings management. Large firms are likely to
be of interest to financial analysts and the business community. Therefore, in order to
maintain their reputation, large firms are more likely to use an income-increasing
accrual as a way to smooth their income, compared to their smaller counterparts, in
order to reduce their visibility. As a result, the income-increasing and income-
decreasing accruals might offset each other, resulting in insignificant results. Quality
auditors are also not effective in mitigating earnings management.
We also examined the direction of the accruals as opposed to absolute accruals. This
further analysis was motivated by Peni and Vahamaa (2010) and Thiruvadi and Huang
(2011) who find that women directors are more conservative when it comes to accrual











































6. Further analysis – women and income-decreasing earnings
management
Our findings reported above revealed that the influence of women on boards and audit
committees on the propensity to manage earnings is not significant. Hence, it is of
interest to determine whether women are able to influence the board and audit
committee in engaging in income-decreasing rather than income-increasing accruals.
On the one hand, income-decreasing earnings management reflects high accounting
conservatism; on the other hand, income-increasing earnings management reflects
aggressive earnings management. Although either direction could be considered
unethical, the intention of the former is more consistent with prudence, whereas the
intention of the former is more inclined towards misleading the users of financial
statements. Overall, being prudent is more acceptable than being aggressive.
Consistent with prior studies which suggest that women are more conservative, risk
averse and ethical (e.g. Beckmann and Menkhoff, 2008; Eckel and Grossman, 2008;
Fehr-Duda, 2006; Watson and McNaughton, 2007), Peni and Vahamaa (2010) reveal
that firms with female CFOs are associated with income-decreasing DACC. Thus, their
evidence suggests a high degree of conservatism among female CFOs compared to
their male counterparts. This evidence is supported by Thiruvadi and Huang (2011)
who find that the representation of women on the audit committee (WOMAC) is
associated with income-decreasing earnings management.
In our further analyses, the DACC value of signed DACC is used to indicate the
direction of earnings management, i.e. either income-decreasing (negative DACC) and
income-increasing earnings management (positive DACC). In other words, a company
practises income-decreasing earnings management if its DACC is negative, and vice
versa. All other variables are as explained earlier. The results are shown in Table V.
Based on the evidence in Table V, the presence of women on boards is not associated
with conservative or aggressive earnings management, confirming the earlier findings
when absolute DACC were used. On the other hand, the presence of WOMAC is
negatively associated with DACC, indicating that the presence of women on audit
committees is associated with income-decreasing earnings management. Thus, our
evidence in this regard is consistent with that of Thiruvadi and Huang (2011). There are
several plausible explanations for this finding. First, perhaps, when assigned a specific
task such as the task of overseeing the financial reporting process, women directors are
able to discharge their duties more effectively compared to when they only sit on the
board. It is possible that when specific tasks are assigned to them, the female audit
committee members are better prepared for meetings. This is consistent with the
arguments put forward by Stewart and Munro (2007). Further, women might be more
effective in discharging their duties in small groups, such as an audit committee as
opposed to in larger groups like the board of directors. Additionally, the evidence
supports the contention that women are conservative (Gold et al., 2009; Powell and
Ansic, 1997) and their conservatism becomes apparent when they are assigned specific
tasks (Peni and Vahamaa, 2010). Another explanation may be that the majority of
women who sit on the board may not have the accounting and financial skills
necessary to detect earnings management, as only about 30 per cent of women
directors have an accounting and finance background (Abdullah et al., 2016).
The evidence in Table V further reveals that there is also a tendency for income-
increasing earnings management in family-owned firms, as indicated by the significant
and positive coefficient for FAMOWN. Therefore, this evidence supports the existence








































we included the interaction of women directors (i.e. WOMBD and audit committee) with
family ownership, the interactive effects are not statistically positive even though they
are positive. Hence, neither WOMBD nor WOMAC interact with family ownership to
influence earnings management. It is interesting to note that the influence alone of
WOMAC on their own remains significant and, in fact, the coefficient is more negative
(i.e. −0.016 vs −0.018) even with the inclusion of interaction between WOMAC and
family ownership. Overall, taking the results together, the effects of WOMAC on
income-decreasing earnings management decreases (from −0.016 to only −0.01 (i.e.
−0.018+0.000)). Hence, the influence of WOMAC is reduced in family-owned firms.
In other words, the role of WOMAC becomes less effective in family-owned firms.
Another interesting observation derived from the results in Table V is that the
tendency for family ownership to increase income through accruals on its own has now
become statistically insignificant (FAMOWN in column 3). Further, the effects of family
ownership and its interaction with WOMAC (FAMOWN×WOMAC) are also
insignificant (i.e. 0.001+0.008¼ 0.009) compared to the positive and significant
association without the interaction (i.e. 0.12 in column 1 in Table V). Therefore, the
effectiveness of WOMAC to promote income-decreasing is reduced in family firms.
These findings are thus consistent with the findings of Jaggi et al. (2009).
As shown in Table V, several control variables significantly affect the direction of
earnings management. First, BODIND, does not seem to influence the absolute DACC,
which is associated with income-decreasing accruals, suggesting that independent
DACC ¼ a0þb1WOMBDþb2WOMACþb3FAMOWNþb4WOMBD
FAMOWN b5WOMAC  FAMOWNþ
P
biXþe
Without family interaction With family interaction
Indepenvdent variables Coefficients t-values Coefficients t-values
Constant −1.456 (−6.99)** −1.456 (−6.99)**
WOMBD 0.009 (0.91) 0.004 (0.37)
WOMAC −0.016 (−2.80)** −0.018 (−2.93)**
FAMOWN 0.012 (2.30)* 0.001 (0.18)
WOMBD×FAMOWN 0.016 (1.62)
WOMAC×FAMOWN 0.008 (0.73)
BODIND −0.070 (−2.10)* −0.070 (−2.10)*
BODSIZE 0.001 (0.37) 0.001 (0.45)
ACSIZE 0.009 (1.32) 0.009 (1.38)
ACEXPRT 0.006 (1.44) 0.006 (1.39)
COSIZE 0.072 (6.99)** 0.072 (6.99)**
ROA 0.384 (15.70)** 0.383 (15.66)**
LEV −0.046 (−2.80)** −0.044 (−2.71)**
BIG4 −0.008 (−0.79) −0.008 (−0.75)
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.075
F-statistics 41.59** 35.56**
Notes: n¼ 2,412. DACC, signed discretionary accruals; WOMBD, the presence of women on the board
(1: yes; 0: otherwise); WOMAC, the presence of women on audit committee (1: yes; 0: otherwise);
BODIND, the proportion of independent directors on the board; BODSIZE, the number of directors on
the board; ACSIZE, the number of directors on audit committee; ACEXPERT, number of accounting
experts on audit committee; COSIZE, natural log of firm’s total assets; ROA, ratio of net income to total
assets; LEV, ratio of total debts to total assets; BIG4, audit quality (1: BIG4 auditors; 0: otherwise);
FAMOWN, family ownership (1: a family owns at least 20 per cent the firm’s shares; 0: otherwise).












































directors are more cautious and prudent in exercising their duty. We believe they tend to
avoid aggressive accruals that would mislead shareholders in order to maintain their
reputation as independent directors. This is consistent with agency theory. Second,
COSIZE, which does not significantly influence the propensity to manage earnings, is
associated with income-increasing accruals. This implies that larger (smaller) companies
are more likely to be associated with income-increasing (income-decreasing) rather than
income-decreasing (income-increasing) accruals. One explanation for this result is that
bigger firms are more likely to be of interest to analysts and are the subjects of public
scrutiny. Thus, they may have a higher incentive to increase income in order to meet
earnings targets. In addition, large firms are more likely to overstate earnings because
their activities are complex and users may have difficulty detecting earnings
overstatements (Ishak et al., 2011; Lobo and Zhou, 2006; Shen and Chih, 2007).
Third, firm’s ROA, which in our previous analysis was negatively associated with
the propensity for earnings management, is now associated with income-increasing
earnings management. Our findings indicate that accrual management provides an
opportunity to firms to increase earnings in order to avoid the risk of bankruptcy,
which could lead to litigation risks (Bartov et al., 2000). Fourth, firms’ LEV, which was
earlier found to be positively associated with the tendency to manage earnings, is now
associated with income-decreasing accruals. Hence, high debt levels could trigger a
higher degree of monitoring by the debt-holders which serves as an effective monitor of
accrual management (Chung et al., 2005). Further, high LEV could also lead to contract
renegotiation and income-decreasing accruals (Abdullah and Mohd Nasir, 2004; Gore
et al., 2001). The remaining control variables (i.e. BODSIZE, ACSIZE, ACEXPRT, and
BIG4) are not associated with either income-decreasing or income-increasing earnings
management. Our earlier arguments with respect to why these corporate governance
mechanisms do not influence earnings management hold.
7. Robustness tests
In order to test the robustness of our findings, we ran further analyses by varying the
operational definition of WOMBD: the number of WOMBD, the percentage of WOMBD,
and when there are two or more WOMBD. The number and percentage of WOMBD
imply the extent of female participation in boards. Another important issue with
respect to WOMBD is that of the tipping point or critical mass. It is argued that for
women to be effective, the board must have a critical mass of women directors, or have
reached the tipping point where at least three women are on the board (Kanter, 1977;
Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). As less than three per cent of firms have three
or more WOMBD in our sample, we used the cut-off of two directors as the tipping
point instead of that of three used in earlier studies (Kanter, 1977; Konrad et al., 2008;
Torchia et al., 2011), which represented about 13 per cent of the total firm-years.
The results are shown in Table VI.
The results in Table VI generally are in agreement with the results in Tables IV and V,
in which WOMBD are not associated with either the propensity for or the direction of
earnings management. Therefore, merely having WOMBD does not seem to have any
influence on earnings management. Therefore, regardless of whether there is one woman
or more on the board, women’s influence on constraining earnings management is limited.
Thus, our findings do not support the tipping point argument or critical mass theory
(Kanter, 1977; Konrad et al., 2008; Torchia et al., 2011). Rather, all our evidence shows that
it only matters that women are appointed to the audit committee so that are they able to



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8. Summary and conclusions
The Malaysian Government took a major step in 2004 when it introduced a policy on the
appointment of women to senior positions in the public sector. The policy signalled
the Malaysian Government’s efforts to give greater opportunity to women to hold
positions at decision-making levels. As a result, the percentage of women holding
senior positions in the public sector has increased significantly. In 2011, the Government
applied the same policy to listed firms hoping that the success in increasing the
percentage of women holding key posts in the public sector would be replicated in
the private sector.
In this study, first, we examined if women’s participation in the board and audit
committee reduced earnings management. Second, we analysed whether women’s
presence was associated with income-decreasing earnings management. Third, we
investigated if family ownership moderated the effectiveness of women directors and
women audit committee members in mitigating earnings management. Our evidence
shows that only about 8 per cent of the total board seats of listed firms in Malaysia for
the 2008-2011 financial years were allocated to women. Hence, at the current rate, the
target of 30 per cent WOMBD of listed firms by 2016 seems to be impossible to achieve.
On the role of women, women directors are not associated either with a propensity for
earnings management or the direction of earnings management. Similarly,
their presence in family-owned firms is not able to mitigate income-increasing
earnings management.
Our evidence reveals that the presence of women directors on the audit committee is
associated with income-reducing earnings management. However, the influence of the
presence of women the audit committee on income-decreasing earnings management is
reduced marginally when its interactive effects with family ownership are taken into
account. Hence, in general, our study suggests that having women directors who only
serve on the board is not sufficient for women to make a difference in terms of
mitigating aggressive earnings management. They need to serve on the audit
committee at the same time. In conclusion, the presence of women directors on audit
committees appears to be effective in promoting income-decreasing earnings
management practices. Therefore, the Malaysian Government’s policy of requiring
listed firms to appoint women on their boards alone is not enough. Rather, firms should
also appoint women to the audit committee in order to help improve the quality of
financial reports. Therefore, the relevant authorities in Malaysia might want to
consider a policy of requiring listed firms to appoint a woman director to the firm’s
audit committee. In other words, firms should capitalize on women’s good
characteristics, such as risk aversion, caution, and ethical outlook by appointing
them to serve on the audit committee.
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